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Abstract
The violation of Bell inequalities seems to establish an important fact about
the world: that it is non-local. However, this result relies on the assumption
of the statistical independence of the measurement settings with respect to
potential past events that might have determined them. Superdeterminism
refers to the view that a local, and determinist, account of Bell inequalities
violations is possible, by rejecting this assumption of statistical indepen-
dence. We examine and clarify various problems with superdeterminism,
looking in particular at its consequences on the nature of scientific laws and
scientific reasoning. We argue that the view requires a neo-Humean ac-
count of at least some laws, and creates a significant problem for the use of
statistical independence in other parts of physics and science more generally.
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1 Introduction
According to the superdeterministic view of the violation of Bell inequal-
ities, the choices of the measures to be taken on systems are themselves
determined by some past events and it is that determination that explains
the violation of Bell inequalities—rather than a non-local connection exist-
ing between distant entities. Thus, in this approach, the violations of Bell
inequalities can be explained away without positing any spooky form of ac-
tion at a distance—understood in a broad sense as some sort of ontological
non-locality, to be interpreted further.1 However, this entails that the mea-
surement independence assumption is not satisfied. This assumption states
that measurement settings are statistically independent from whatever may
determine the physical state to be measured and plays a crucial role in
the derivation of Bell inequalities. Superdeterministic theories have been
advocated by ’t Hooft (2014), Palmer (2016) and Hossenfelder and Palmer
(2020), and a way to test experimentally a subclass of superdeterministic
theories has even been put forward by Hossenfelder (2011). However, most
physicists do not seriously consider superdeterministic theories as interpre-
tations of Bell inequalities—although, importantly, they often acknowledge
that the superdeterminist loophole cannot, as a matter of principle, be
closed.
In this essay, we undertake the task of clarifying and distinguishing be-
tween various reasons one may have to dismiss superdeterministic theories
in general (superdeterminism in the next)—with a focus on epistemological
and metaphysical consequences of the view. As we shall see, and contrary to
what has unfortunately been claimed on several occasions by physicists, the
strongest objections to superdeterminism can—and must—be formulated
without appealing to the concept of free will. In fact, this reference to free
will, which has been introduced by Bell himself, has caused some confusion
during the last decades. In the following, we first make clear why objections
to superdeterminism should avoid relying on the existence of free will, and
then we announce the structure of the paper.
1In this essay, we do not say anything about how we should analyse ontologically the concept
of non-locality itself, or of non-separability, or whether several distinct relations display non-
locality in a broad sense. We shall restrict our inquiry to the possibility to adopt a local theory
of quantum mechanics, in a broad sense of locality encompassing separability (see sub-section
2.1 for a definition).
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Here is how Bell discussed the idea of superdeterminism, in a BBC in-
terview in 1985 (reproduced in Davies and Brown 1993):
There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and
spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism
in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the
world is superdeterministic, with not just inanimate nature run-
ning on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, in-
cluding our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment
rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the ‘de-
cision’ by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements
rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need
for a faster-than-light signal to tell particle A what measurement
has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, includ-
ing particle A, already ‘knows’ what that measurement, and its
outcome, will be.
Here we find the superdeterminist idea of an ‘apparent pre-agreement’
between the two measurement settings and the state to be measured. But
Bell goes further and claims that free will could not exist in a superdetermin-
istic world. He suggest that the experimenters’ capacity to freely choose the
measurement settings comes under attack when operating in the background
of a superdeterministic theory. Superdeterminism is hence characterised as
an ‘absolute determinism in the universe’, equated with a ‘complete absence
of free will’.
It is important at this stage to carefully distinguish between two assump-
tions about free will: (a1) free will exists and is a metaphysical prerequisite
to engage with science,2 and (a2) if free will exists then it guarantees, at least
in some situations submitted to Bell tests, that the measurement indepen-
dence assumption is satisfied. This assumption states that the measurement
settings are freely chosen independently of some common past event. What
Bell is not claiming here, which would constitute a third distinct assump-
tion, is: (a3) without free will, the measurement independence assumption
cannot be satisfied. In this paper, we shall see that the first, and a for-
tiori the second, assumptions are not needed in order to assess and criticise
superdeterminism—and that the third assumption is simply false.
Indeed, the focus on free will strikes us as unfortunate for several rea-
sons. First, superdeterminism is the conjunction of determinism and the
atypicality of cosmological initial conditions—as we will explain in the next
2Hence Larsson (2014), among others, claims that “the loophole of superdeterminism cannot
be closed by scientific methods; the assumption that the world is not superdeterministic is needed
to do science in the first place”. This position, in the context of Bell’s tenets, originates in the
works of Shimony, Horne, Clauser and Bell (for a review see Vervoort 2013).
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section—and as such, is no more problematic for free will than any deter-
ministic theory. If one accepts the incompatibilist claim that free will is
incompatible with determinism, it follows trivially that free will is incom-
patible with superdeterminism. In fact, there are many ways to reconcile
free will with determinism, namely to endorse a form of compatibilism (for
an overview, see e.g. McKenna and Coates 2016). If free will is compat-
ible with determinism, it is not clear why it should be incompatible with
superdeterminism. Second, Esfeld (2015) has recently, and convincingly to
our mind, argued that Bell’s theorem is logically independent from the issue
of determinism–indeterminism, which entails, a fortiori, that superdetermin-
ism has nothing to do with free will. As we will see, the assumption of free
will does not necessarily ensure the statistical independence required in Bell
tests. More generally, Bell’s theorem remains independent of the (super)
determinism–indeterminism dispute, thereby showing that assumption (a3),
namely that without free will the measurement independence assumption
would not be satisfied, is false. Thus, the focus on free will is misleading:
the genuine worries with superdeterminism arise from the rejection of sta-
tistical independence—not from an alleged tension with the concept of free
will.
In section 2, we first introduce superdeterministic theories and then as-
sess the arguments usually given in favor of the satisfaction of the mea-
surement independence assumption. We review the different strategies used
in experimental Bell tests to select measurement settings and criticise the
implicit role sometimes attributed to free will. In section 3, we discuss the
implications of superdeterminism on the metaphysics of laws of nature and
in section 4 we assess the epistemological consequences that superdetermin-
ism would have for the practice of science.
2 Superdeterministic Theories
Superdeterminists reject the measurement independence assumption in sharp
contrast with most other interpretations, which reject the locality assump-
tion. In this section, we present briefly Bell inequalities, clarify how these
assumptions relate to each other and close by discussing the main motiva-
tions for subscribing to the measurement independence assumption.
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2.1 Bell inequalities
Bell inequalities3 have been derived using different sets of assumptions and,
as such, one may explain their violation in various ways depending on which
assumption is rejected. Tests of Bell inequalities run as follows: measure-
ments are performed at two different spacelike separated locations—say A
and B. Call the measurement settings x and y respectively and the outcomes
of the measurement a and b respectively. Call λ some hidden variables that
could have determined the measurement settings. These were historically
introduced to account for the statistical nature of the quantum predictions
and possibly complete the description of the quantum state, the quantum
correlations being recovered by averaging over the hidden variables with
some probability distribution P .
The main current theories of quantum mechanics reject locality. This
is true of both deterministic approaches (including Bohmian mechanics, see
Du¨rr and Teufel 2009 and the many-worlds approach, see e.g. Wallace 2012)
and indeterministic approaches (with collapse theories as the so-called GRW
theory, Ghirardi et al. 1986). But, interestingly, Bell’s theorem relies more
generally on the free-choice assumption, which is already a complex assump-
tion that must be analysed as the conjunction of the locality assumption and
the measurement independence assumption:
• Locality Assumption (LA)4: P (a, b|x, y, λ) = P (a|x, λ) · P (b|y, λ).
• Measurement Independence Assumption (MIA): P (x, y|λ) =
P (x, y).
In the logical space of the possible accounts of the violation of Bell in-
equalities, superdeterminism exploits the possible failure of MIA. Hence,
superdeterminism offers a potential local interpretation of Bell inequality
violations, namely one which does not accept non-locality. However, it is
important to be careful here since, as Hossenfelder (2011) rightly points
out, superdeterminism also contradicts the first conjunct of the free-choice
assumption, at least in some particular sense. Indeed, since the two mea-
surement settings x and y are already determined via a past event, strictly
speaking, there is already an indirect form of non-locality. However, this
non-locality is not substantial. As Hossenfelder puts it, this non-locality
“does however a priori not necessitate superluminal exchange of information
3There are various Bell’s type inequalities. In this section we consider the so-called CHSH
inequality as a particular example. More generally in the paper, Bell inequalities and Bell tests
refer respectively to the set of all inequalities evidencing non-locality and their tests (for an
exhaustive account see Brunner et al. 2014).
4It is the conjunction of the parameter independence assumption: P (a|λ, x, y) = P (a|λ, x)
and P (b|λ, x, y) = P (b|λ, y); and the outcome independence assumption: P (a, b|x, y, λ) =
P (a|x, y, λ) · P (b|x, y, λ). See Myrvold et al. (2019, section 3.1.2).
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or action at a distance” (Hossenfelder, 2011, 1524). To put it in more philo-
sophical terms, the form of non-locality entailed by superdeterminism does
not rely on the existence of some primitive relation of ontological dependence
existing between the two systems, or of any other modally-loaded connect-
ing relation (for a recent analysis of what we call ‘substantive non-locality’,
see e.g. Calosi and Morganti, forthcoming). For the sake of argument, in
what follows we will refer to ‘substantive non-locality’ as ‘non-locality’.
Interestingly, this loophole in the inference from the violation of Bell
inequalities to non-locality—since it is possible to reject MIA—cannot be
definitively closed.5 Assuming the causal structure of special relativity, the
two events corresponding to the choices of the settings have a common past,
which is given by the overlap of their backward light cones. As a result,
it could be that both of them were jointly determined in the past—even
before the entangled state was produced. Therefore, and although it has
been claimed that it is possible to run loophole-free Bell tests (see for in-
stance Gallicchio et al. 2014; Abella´n 2018), there does exist a possible way
to escape (substantial) non-locality, entailing a potential loophole in the
inference of non-locality from the violation of Bell inequalities.
In this context, superdeterminism refers to a class of theories that build
on the rejection of MIA (see ’t Hooft 2014 and Palmer 2016).6
2.2 The Measurement Independence Assumption
Call Pmi the process that generates a sequence of bits used to drive the
settings. Pmi has been realised by a pseudo-random numbers generator
(Aspect et al., 1982), a quantum process (Weihs et al., 1998; Giustina et al.,
2015), cosmic photons (Gallicchio et al., 2014)—a proposition implemented
with photons emitted by Milky Way stars (Handsteiner et al., 2017)—a ‘cul-
tural pseudo-random numbers’ generator, that is the pixels of some digitised
popular movie (Shalm et al., 2015), or more recently the ‘free’ instructions
given by one hundred thousand people (Abella´n, 2018). These examples
show different strategies, more or less explicitly acknowledged by the au-
thors, used to give support to—allegedly—the satisfaction of MIA.
5See also Gisin and Zbinden (1999).
6Another possible loophole was mentioned recently by Adlam (2018): temporal non-locality.
Temporal non-locality shares with superdeterminism the idea that apparent cases of spatial non-
locality may be explained away by considering the past. However, temporal non-locality—in
shark contrast with superdeterminism—amounts to an indeterminist account of Bell inequality
violations. Indeed, in this approach the causal chain of determination jumps in time over inter-
vals, connecting timelike (rather than spacelike) separated events. It means that this view also
entails the violation of statistical independence. As a result, and although we will not consider
further temporal non-locality, we take our discussion of superdeterminism to be of importance
for temporally non-local interpretations of quantum mechanics.
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We may identify three distinct strategies in this constellation of experi-
ments:
1. The ‘random outcome’ strategy uses a process that we have reasons
to believe to provide statistically independent outcomes: for instance,
a pseudo-random numbers process—as implemented by an algorithm
running on a computer—; a quantum process as in the physical descrip-
tion provided by ID quantique7; or a chaotic process, as turbulence
causing fluctuations of the transmitted intensity of a laser beam prop-
agating through the atmosphere (see random.org). In this strategy,
the conclusion relies either on statistical tests, as the ones provided by
the NIST (Rukhin et al., 2001), or by an analysis the process gener-
ating the sequence (see 2.3). In both cases, the confidence that the
outcomes are statistically independent come from the implausibility of
a causal link.
2. In the ‘past events’ strategy, x and y are determined by two different
events located ‘far away’ in their past. The strategy relies on the im-
plausibility of a correlation between x and y. Basically, the more the
distance between the two events is, and the more the time interval be-
tween each of these events is, the more implausible a causal mechanism
and thus a correlation are expected to be. Handsteiner et al. (2017)
used signals coming from Milky Way stars and concluded that the
“most recent time by which any local-realist influences could have en-
gineered the observed Bell violation” cannot be earlier than around six
hundred years. This time has been claimed to be improved by around
twenty orders of magnitude by “using pairs of quasars or patches of
the cosmic microwave background” (Gallicchio et al., 2014).
3. Finally, the free-will strategy relies on the existence of one, or several,
free agent(s) ‘responsible’ for the choice of the measurement settings x
and y. This strategy entails a strong view about the existence of ‘meta-
physically free’ agents that can bring about some randomness within
the world from the outside, so to speak. For example, Gill et al. (2003)
claim that: “an experimenter is free to make [a choice] in the labora-
tory, and [...] a theoretician is free to make [a choice] in a Gedanken-
experiment” (Gill et al., 2003, 282). And they then go on to connect
this metaphysical freedom to the existence of randomness in the world:
“We shall convert this freedom into a statistical independence assump-
tion”.8
7See https://www.idquantique.com/random-number-generation/overview/.
8Pironio (2015) proposes different scenarios in order to make the correlation more and more
implausible; however, although not explicitly stated, it seems that each scenario falls under to
the free-will strategy.
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The first two strategies aim at assessing as highly unlikely the claim that
the measurement settings have been determined in the past in such a way as
to entail observed results in the present; nonetheless, and independently of
the level of complexity involved in each of these strategies, none of them has
the resources to definitively—as a matter of logical necessity—close the su-
perdeterminist loophole. In a nutshell, unlikeliness is not impossibility. The
third strategy differs radically by its nature and results. It always succeeds,
and that is no surprise as the strategy assumes that free will exists and (a2)
(“if free will exists then it guarantees, at least in some situations submitted
to Bell’s tests, that the measurement independence assumption is satisfied”)
without any justification. Given this petitio principii, there is no need to
test statistical independence experimentally and, importantly, it is useless
to complicate the scenario by involving more and more agents or trying to
combine the third strategy with one of the first two strategies—except for
practical reasons as to increase the rate of instructions for the measurement
settings. Also, it remains unclear how statistical independence could be
derived from the existence of free will, and on top of that, full statistical in-
dependence is not required. Indeed, at least concerning Bell’s theorem, MIA
can be relaxed (see Barrett and Gisin 2011 and the discussion in the next
subsection). And regarding free will, as we pointed out in the introduction,
there is no need to postulate free will when discussing the philosophical in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, the existence of free will
is a highly non-trivial assumption that unnecessarily complicates the situa-
tion. Therefore, we believe that this line of thought should be discontinued.
2.3 Determinism and Statistical Independence
Statistical independence may come for free in indeterministic theories but
it can also be derived within a deterministic theory. In this subsection,
we first briefly sketch out the derivation of statistical independence as we
find it in the literature. Then we comment on a recent work showing that,
in principle, a Bell test can be conducted with the certification that the
measurement independence assumption is satisfied, if cosmological initial
conditions are taken to be typical.
Statistical independence has been derived in the case of the Galton
board in Du¨rr and Teufel (2009) (see also the enlightening discussions in
Lazarovici and Reichert 2015).9 In what follows, we sketch out how this
sort of derivation proceeds (for a formal and complete presentation, see
9A Galton board, also named a ‘bean machine’ or ‘Quincunx’, consists of a vertical board with
horizontal lines of pegs separated by an equal distance. From one line to another, the pegs are
moved from half this distance. Balls, whose diameters are smaller that the inter-pegs distances,
are dropped from the top of the board and bounce either left or right as they hit the pegs, and
eventually, end up in boxes at the bottom.
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Du¨rr and Teufel 2009). The distribution of the balls typically observed at
the bottom of the Galton board fits well with a probabilistic distribution,
which relies on statistical independence. To obtain these statistical reg-
ularities within a deterministic framework, we have to look at the initial
randomness of the balls entering the Galton board and eventually trace
back this randomness up to the beginning of the universe. In a nutshell, in
order to get statistical independence in a deterministic theory—here the dy-
namics is assumed to be Newtonian—Du¨rr and Teufel (2009) assume some
distribution for the initial conditions of the balls entering the Galton board,
and eventually some distribution for the initial conditions of the universe,
namely the cosmological initial conditions. They then introduce a typicality
measure for this set of cosmological initial conditions. Statistical indepen-
dence follows from any typical initial state.10 Think for instance about the
specific situation in which the balls enter the Galton board at exactly the
same location. As the dynamics is deterministic, they will all end up in
the very same position, which is in contradiction with statistical regularities
as usually observed. And going backward to the beginning of the universe,
so to speak, this particular distribution of the balls in the Galton board
can only follow from atypical cosmological initial conditions. Therefore,
the atypicality of the cosmological initial conditions does not allow to derive
statistical regularities. This atypicality is precisely what superdeterminism
has to assume in order to claim that the measurements settings are already
determined by a very distant past event in spacetime.
Then it is natural to ask whether a Bell test could be set up in such a
way that the previous derivation could be used to satisfy MIA.11
It is common to acknowledge that the complexity of the derivation sket-
ched above makes the derivation ‘practically impossible’ for any ‘realistic’
system (Du¨rr and Teufel, 2009). Now it happens that this limitation has
been recently overcome, at least in principle, by using randomness ampli-
fication (Colbeck and Renner, 2012). In short, the idea is to relax MIA;
see e.g. Hall (2010); Barrett and Gisin (2011). By starting with a sequence
of an arbitrarily small amount of randomness, a Bell test can be used to
amplify it at will, such that the sequence obtained, certified to be random,
can be used to drive the measurement settings. Hence “a relaxed free choice
assumption is sufficient to establish all results derived under the assumption
10For the sake of brevity we did not mention the ‘statistical hypothesis’, which plays an es-
sential role in the derivation by Du¨rr and Teufel (2009): it stipulates how the typicality of the
cosmological initial conditions is measured.
11Note that there are examples of models, local and deterministic that reproduce a violation of
Bell inequalities. More generally, Brans (1988) and Hall (2016) have shown that any statistical
correlation has a local and deterministic model. Those models take the measurement settings to
be determined by local hidden variables; they contradict MIA but they also fail to reproduce all
aspects of a Bell experiments since they do not reproduce the apparent satisfaction of MIA in
the experiments. In other words, those examples are not models of superdeterministic theories.
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of virtually perfect free choices” (Colbeck and Renner, 2012). Now, as the
randomness amplification is expressed in the quantum formalism, it can be
phrased within a deterministic quantum theory, say Bohmian mechanics. As
should be clear by now, this description eventually relies on the assumption
that the initial sequence includes some randomness. And, in order to take
place in a deterministic framework, we need to assume the typicality of the
cosmological initial conditions of such a world. What matters at this point,
is that for MIA to be true in the case of the Galton board, the cosmological
initial conditions must be typical. This particular case may be regarded as a
model case: indeed, what is true of this particular simple case, ideal in many
respects, should be expected to hold for systems more complex than the
Galton board, much closer to real systems, as described in Du¨rr and Teufel
(2009).12 As we shall see, the atypicality implicitly assumed by superdeter-
minism has strong implications for philosophical debates on the nature of
laws of nature, and for the very possibility of using statistical reasoning in
science.
3 The Metaphysics of Superdeterminism
Superdeterminism entails at least two interesting and potentially problem-
atic metaphysical consequences that we review in this section. 1) It requires
an atypical fine-tuning of the initial state of the universe. 2) It entails that
some laws of nature are contingent and ontologically depend on cosmological
initial conditions.
3.1 The Fine-Tuning of Initial Conditions
The situation bears similarities with the problem of the fine-tuning of funda-
mental constants in scientific cosmology. Indeed, the fundamental constants
in the standard model of cosmology have highly specific values for a few
parameters in such a way that, if these values had been different, the world
as we know it, with its complex organisation, would not have existed, and
would not have allowed for the emergence of complex systems—and, in par-
ticular, of sentient individuals. One may then ask: why is it the case that
these parameters do have these specific values? In response, physicists and
philosophers have been considering various strategies such as: 1) Something
unlikely to happen happened and there is nothing to be surprised about
(see e.g. Juhl 2006); 2) A divine being created laws of nature and fine-
tuned the fundamental constants in the right way to allow for life to emerge
(Swinburne, 2003); 3) We live in a multiverse composed of an infinity of
12This result follows strategy (a), except that the certification does not rely on statistical tests
but on a derivation, which relies on the assumption of typical cosmological initial conditions.
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universes with distinct values for the fundamental constants, and only some
of these universes have the right values, allowing the existence of observers
who then express puzzlement about the fine-tuning of the particular uni-
verse that they do inhabit (see e.g. Smart 1989, Susskind 2005); 4) This is
a false problem for some reason (for instance because the model with these
parameters relies on non-fundamental theories, with the expectation that
a more fundamental theory could do without such parameters, or because
probabilities are ill-defined).
The situation for superdeterminism is similar but not wholly identical:
the fine-tuning of initial conditions forces a choice between some of those
strategies. A witty god could have fine-tuned the initial conditions, it might
be that an unlikely cosmic coincidence happened, or it might be that quan-
tum mechanics, because of its lack of fundamentality for instance, should
not be used to derive philosophical consequences. However, the multiverse
proposal is not available here. Atypical conditions are not required for sen-
tient life to exist, as far as we can tell, but only for us to be able to observe
systematic violations when testing Bell inequalities.
Thus, the problem of fine-tuning is not specific to superdeterminism and
we will set it aside. However, as we shall see, the asymmetry between the
fine-tuning of parameters in cosmology, on the one hand, and the atyp-
icality of initial conditions in superdeterminism, on the other hand, has
consequences on the metaphysics of laws of nature.
3.2 Laws of Nature
As said above, a slight variation in the initial conditions at the beginning
of the universe would prevent systematic conclusive Bell tests since those
would require both the violation of the inequality under scrutiny and the
experimental satisfaction of the free-choice assumption. Although the non-
satisfaction of the second condition appears as a potential way out, we shall
see in the next section that it conflicts with actual scientific practice. So for
now, let us just assume the non-satisfaction of the first condition, i.e. that
the inequalities are violated. It would entail that quantum laws theorising
on those violations would not exist.13 This means that superdeterminism
entails two metaphysical consequences regarding the modal status of these
laws. First, the quantum laws are contingent—indeed, in possible worlds
with different initial conditions, these laws do not exist. Second, and more
problematically, these laws ontologically depend upon the initial conditions.
Let us look at the two consequences.
As a first consequence, laws of nature turn out to be contingent—or, at
13By ‘quantum laws’ we refer to the set of laws of any theory which could give an account of
the violations of Bell inequalities. The different quantum theories give examples of such sets of
laws.
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the very least, the quantum laws turn out to be contingent (indeed, this con-
tingency is logically consistent with other laws being necessary). At least,
this is true if we accept that cosmological initial conditions could have been
different, a claim which is not that trivial. Indeed, still in the framework
of superdeterminism, if cosmological initial conditions could not have been
different from what they are, then quantum laws would be necessary. Tak-
ing initial conditions as contingent is clearly a natural attitude in physics,
and this is probably the mainstream position in the metaphysics of laws of
nature, but it is not clear that the attitude of the physicist towards initial
conditions, in practice, should be extended to cosmological initial conditions.
However, this question does not matter for our current purpose since, as we
shall see, it is not the modal status of laws of nature that is problematic
in the superdeterministic setting; the most pressing issue arises from the
ontological dependence of laws on cosmological initial conditions.
Superdeterminism entails that the cosmological initial conditions shape
the form of the laws of nature or, as mentioned above, of at least the quan-
tum laws.14 This view is quite unusual and should be noted since laws of
nature are commonly regarded as being ontologically independent from any
set of initial conditions, in the sense that varying the initial conditions do
not modify the laws of nature.15 Superdeterminism, however entails that
quantum laws ontologically depend on initial conditions in general and, in
fine, on the cosmological initial conditions. This consequence is quite strange
and sheds suspicion on the whole idea of superdeterminism. But, as we shall
see: a) this picture looks more reasonable if we adopt a neo-Humean pic-
ture of laws and, b) more generally, our intuition that laws of nature cannot
depend upon the cosmological initial conditions follows from a particular
account of laws of nature—namely, primitivism about laws.
There are mainly four views about the nature of law: 1) primitivism,
namely the view that laws of nature are primitive entities that cannot be
explained further (see e.g. Maudlin 2007a), 2) the neo-Humean view cham-
pioned by Lewis (1986, ix) that “all there is in the world is a vast mosaic of
local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another”; 3)
the dispositionalist view that identify laws of nature to dispositional prop-
erties of objects, processes, natural kinds and/or other categories of entities
(Ellis, 2001; Bird, 2005) and 4) the DTA view that identify laws of nature
to second-order relations of necessitation connecting first-order universals,
a view defended by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1978,
1983).
The clean distinction between laws and initial conditions somewhat van-
ishes in the context of a neo-Humean picture, since laws of nature do not
exist in this account. What we do have at the ontological level is only a
14Cf. the previous note.
15With the interesting exception of the neo-Humean view, as we shall see below.
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mosaic of facts, properties, or events, organised by a background ordering
structure, standardly identified with spacetime. There is some room for
interpreting the exact nature of the organised building blocks (facts, prop-
erties, objects, events) and the exact nature of the ordering structure (a
substantial spacetime, a relationist spacetime, a metric field coupled to a
derivative manifold of points, a metric field only, or a non-spatiotemporal
quantum gravity structure like spin foams for instance16); but the general
point that matters here is the non-modal character of the building blocks
and the ordering structure. The distinction between initial conditions and
laws is then moved from the ontology to the linguistic descriptions: general
statements from which we may derive a lot of particular statements, be-
cause they target regularities at the ontological level, are scientific laws. In
this picture, the fact that some regularities ‘depend upon’ the initial condi-
tions is not particularly problematic. Bell inequality violations follow from
a strange coincidence, that we regard as a law of nature; but this is just the
general strategy of the neo-Humean regarding laws of nature, since there is
no external device of necessitation constraining the distribution of entities
in the natural world.
Primitivism, the dispositionalist view and the DTA view, three particu-
lar versions of a broader necessitarian view, on the other hand, come into
conflict with superdeterminism. Indeed, these accounts do rely on a sharp
distinction between dynamical laws and the systems they evolve. The onto-
logical dependency of laws on cosmological initial conditions becomes puz-
zling since these laws are something over and above the entities they are
evolving. How is a necessitarian superdeterminist to explain that the ne-
cessitation device (primitive laws, dispositional properties or necessitation
relations) depends for its existence on the highly specific cosmological ini-
tial conditions of the actual world? Avoiding cosmic coincidence is usually
regarded as one of the main reasons to adopt a form of necessitarianism
against the neo-Humean picture. A necessitarian superdeterminist would
loose all the benefit of necessitarianism.17 As a consequence, superdetermin-
ism strongly motivates endorsing the neo-Humean view. This point might
count as a bad or a good thing depending on the reader’s allegiance to the
necessitarian or the neo-Humean side. Therefore, superdeterminism under-
mines the main motivations for most account of laws of nature. However,
the neo-Humean view offers an interesting way out for the superdetermin-
16The nature of spacetime varies from one interpretation of GR to another, and is interpreted
differently in the various approaches to quantum gravity (see e.g. Huggett and Wu¨thrich 2013
and Le Bihan and Linnemann 2019).
17Note that a way out for a primitivist superdeterminist would be to state that the so-called
quantum laws are not laws after all; but then the burden of the proof would be on the shoulders
of the advocate of such a move: what would be the relevant criterion to trust other nomological
statements to actually refer to genuine laws of nature?
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ist. As we will now see, the more serious issues with superdeterminism are
epistemological.
4 The Epistemology of Superdeterminism
In this section, we review two epistemological arguments against superde-
terminism. Before that, let us make a comment on a potential weakness
of superdeterminism sometimes noticed. Superdeterminism is not a theory
yet, but rather an ensemble of propositions based on the possibility to for-
mulate a local and deterministic theory, compatible with the violation of
Bell inequalities. To be a theory, superdeterminism would have to provide
an explanation of the exact values associated with the violations of Bell
inequalities, which is what quantum mechanics does.18
We therefore propose more direct epistemological arguments against su-
perdeterminism in this section. First, one might claim that superdeterminis-
tic theories are empirically incoherent by being at odds with their empirical
evidence. Second, statistical independence plays an essential role in contem-
porary science, and cannot be dismissed without loosing the epistemological
justification of science as a whole.
4.1 The Problem of Empirical Coherence
Issues of empirical coherence have been introduced by Barrett (1996) in the
context of quantum mechanics. As he writes: “In order to judge whether
a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable
records of past measurement results that can be compared against the pre-
dictions of the theory” (Barrett, 1996, 49). He then distinguishes theories
of quantum mechanics that can pass the test from other theories of quan-
tum mechanics that cannot pass this test. Problems of empirical coherence
have then been found to be pervasive in physics with the configuration space
18That is another expected task for a theory of superdetermimism. If it is possible in principle
to formulate a local and deterministic theory that accounts for the violation of Bell inequalities,
it is unclear yet how it could impose any bound, except the algebraic bound of 4, contrary to
quantum mechanics, which in the case of CHSH inequality is limited by Tsirelson’s bound 2
√
2
(see Myrvold et al. 2019).
14
realist interpretation of quantum mechanics,19 and quantum gravity.20
Superdeterminists have to deal with their own novel brand of empirical
coherence, one which is at least as problematic as the sorts of empirical
coherence to be found in configuration space realism and quantum grav-
ity. Indeed, on the one hand, superdeterminists claim that we should let go
MIA; on the other hand they assume MIA in order to interpret experiments.
Indeed, as we will discuss in the next section in more detail, statistical data
are produced and regarded as being reliable because they were produced
operating under the assumption of MIA. To put it differently, superdeter-
minists reject MIA in order to make sense of a result obtained by running
experiments and interpreting outputs of those experiments by appealing to
statistical independence. This incoherence is empirical in that it is central
to the way empirical knowledge, based on statistical analysis, is produced.
With the empirical incoherence associated with the denial of the existence of
spacetime, the issue was with each observation/experiment taken separately;
with superdeterminism the empirical incoherence appears at a different level
when using collections of observations to draw consequences. This means
that superdeterminists—by rejecting an assumption essential to the creation
of data to be analysed later on—commit a dialectical mistake.
4.2 Reasoning in Science
The second epistemological argument against superdeterministic theories
starts with the realisation that on a superdeterministic view scientists can
never assume statistical independence. We follow here Goldstein et al. (2011)
when they write:
[T]his assumption is necessarily always made whenever one does
any empirical science; in practice, one assesses the applicability of
the assumption to a given experiment by examining the care with
which the experimental design precludes any non-conspiratorial
dependencies between the preparation of the systems and the
settings of instruments. [...]
19According to this approach to quantum mechanics, the wave function is a real entity, and
since it is defined on a configuration space rather than the ordinary 3D space, we should accept
that our physical world is a physical counterpart of the configuration space—not a 3D space. A
problem of empirical coherence is then to understand the connection between the fundamental
physical structure and the 3D world, and to explain how evidence apparently taking place in 3D
world can justify the view that we live in a structure made of a huge number of dimensions. See
e.g. Monton (2002), Maudlin (2007b), Albert (2013) and Le Bihan (2018).
20Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) have argued that the potential disappearance of space and
time, as observed in various approaches to quantum gravity, leads to an interesting issue of
empirical coherence: how is it possible to justify a theory claiming that space and time do not
exist with evidence localised in space and time?
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[I]f you are performing a drug versus placebo clinical trial, then
you have to select some group of patients to get the drug and
some group of patients to get the placebo. The conclusions drawn
from the study will necessarily depend on the assumption that
the method of selection is independent of whatever characteristics
those patients might have that might influence how they react to
the drug. (Goldstein et al., 2011)
Furthermore, the denial of statistical independence conflicts with basic
notions that allows for scientific practice—both theoretical and experimen-
tal. Indeed, statistical independence is a necessary assumption when doing
science—one which is essential if one wants to make sense of notions such as
isolated system, repetition of an experiment or random measurement error.
Rejecting the statistical independence of the successive runs of exper-
iments restricts drastically the possibility to describe systems as isolated
systems—strictly speaking, only the whole universe fulfills the condition of
isolation. It might be so, but again, to assume that the dynamics is de-
terministic does not prevent statistical independence to exist and does not
bar the road to describing sub-systems as being isolated. Furthermore, re-
jecting statistical independence goes against common practice in modern
science. Indeed, when repeating an experiment, it is usually assumed that
the successive experimental runs are independent from each other. Thus, if
we do not assume statistical independence to begin with, comparing those
experiments turns into an impossible task.
Therefore, if we reject statistical independence as a whole, it becomes
impossible to run repeated measurements since we may no longer suppose
that runs are independent from each other. If the runs are not indepen-
dent, it is not possible anymore to compare them and, so, to offer statistical
interpretations of the data. In a slogan, a full-blown rejection of statisti-
cal independence dooms statistical science. At this point one may wonder:
should a superdeterminist really subscribe to a full-blown rejection of sta-
tistical independence? Why not just adopt the more moderate view that
statistical independence only admits of some exceptions?
According to this approach, MIA fails to apply in—and only in—some
specific circumstances: when Bell inequalities are violated. Let us call this
interpretation ‘exceptionalist superdeterminism’ (exceptionalist SD here-
after). One serious challenge for exceptionalist SD is then to understand
how statistical independence might be sometimes satisfied, and sometimes
not, without being at odds with the rejection of MIA in some contexts. In-
deed, an exceptionalist SD must acknowledge that statistical independence
applies in some circumstances. Thus, they must assert the impossibility of
using those systems in order to set the measurement settings—namely, to
implement Pmi. But what ground is there for such an impossibility? One
first option is that there exists some kind of cosmic principle, a fundamen-
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tal law or a hand of God, preventing us of using those systems to set the
measurement settings. A second option is that systems usually obeying to
statistical independence cease to obey statistical independence as soon as
they are put to work to set the measurement settings. These two options
are both ad hoc and unattractive. We conclude that exceptionalist SD is a
dead end and that superdeterminists cannot appeal to violations a` la carte
of statistical independence.
To conclude this section, let’s take a step back and comment on the dis-
tinction between determinism and superdeterminism. It is common to find
claims in the literature about the alleged incapacity of deterministic theories
to handle statistical independence. But this is not true, as many important
works in the Bohmian tradition have shown, and determinism in itself has
nothing to do with the rejection of statistical independence. Superdetermin-
istic theories—a subset of deterministic theories—take the further step of
rejecting statistical independence, with the unpalatable consequences that
were discussed in this paper. We hope that this work helps to bring into the
light the specific issues of superdeterminism, to which deterministic theories
such as Newtonian mechanics or Bohmian mechanics must not be associated
with.
5 Conclusion
Superdeterminism is a strange interpretation of the violation of Bell inequal-
ities. It states that the world we live in is an incredible coincidence, entailing
the existence of so-called quantum laws, which turn out to be contingent and
ontologically depend upon the cosmological initial conditions. The account
constrains how we should construe laws of nature as it is incompatible with
the view that all laws of nature are external ‘entities’ evolving material sys-
tems through time. This is one bullet the superdeterminist might be willing
to bite. Another issue is that their view entails a global failure of the prin-
ciple of statistical independence, a principle used virtually and successfully
everywhere in contemporary science. Although not necessarily a damning
issue for superdeterminism, it is far from clear how the violations of statisti-
cal independence in quantum mechanics can be stopped from propagating to
classical physical systems: the proponent of superdeterminism should pro-
vide such an explanation in order to connect superdeterminism to the rest of
science. We also note that the original motivation for superdeterminism—
saving locality—is not fully present in the picture of the world we get from
it. Indeed, superdeterminism entails a form of holism as everything remains
‘connected’ in a weak sense since the building blocks of the world cannot be
isolated and probed independently of each other.
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